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Magic at the Margins: Towards a magical realist human geography
The universe is full of magical things, patiently waiting for our wits to grow sharper. 1 In this article I reflect on how the fantastical literary genre magical realism, associated so strongly with the postcolonial Global South, has come to 'enchant' my own work with mental health serviceusers and survivors in the somewhat different geographical context of inner city North East England mental health rehabilitative facilities. In the article I explore how the politically and ontologically subversive strategies of magical realism offer innovative and humane ways of responding to the similarly subversive tales of those living with long term and serious mental health disorders. Joining a growing interest in the discipline in the magical and more-than-rational, 2 I offer a report from the field of what it is to practise as a 'magically oriented' geographer in a complex social and cultural context such as that of mental distress and mental health recovery. Culminating with what I present as a 'magical manifesto' for social research (and maybe for practice as well), I discuss how this magical realist framework might offer a serious response to demands for engagement and criticality within geography and beyond. The paper constitutes a coming together of several themes and agendas in contemporary cultural geography, geographies of mental health/madness 3 , the emerging arena of 'geohumanities', and what has been variously defined as the spectro- 4 or extra-5 geographies of magic, enchantment, spirituality, and the occult -i.e., those forays into the spaces and experiences of everyday life that cannot be seen or mapped in literal or ordinarily explicable ways. More modestly, in bringing the (eminently geographical) writings of magical realism into the different geographical setting of mental health care and recovery, the piece offers a worked example of one more way in which cultural geography might engage with, and benefit from entanglements with literary and fantastical worlds. 6 The arguments in this paper originate as a response to a particular kind of (pervasive and extensively accepted) manner of doing and thinking about research that I shall call here simply the 'best evidence' agenda. What kind of evidence is best and for what purpose, we recognise, will be a matter of context and purpose -compare, for example, the 'best evidences' invoked in evaluating whether Much Ado About Nothing was Shakespeare's best comedy, deciding where in a city to position a new mental health in-patient facility, rejecting the null hypothesis, or coming to a prudent decision about whether acquiring a cat will make for a happier household. By 'best evidence' I refer instead to the ways in which the 'evidence based' discourse (from its origins in evidence-based medicine to today's broader array of professional practices that now seek the 'evidence based' prefix), has carved a distinctive and exclusive notion of what robust and reliable scholarly research must look like.
While scepticism towards the reaches of the evidence agenda (methodologically, epistemologically) has perhaps now become more of a starting than an end point for readers of cultural geographies, three decades since the first appearance of the term 'evidence-based' in the literature, the overarching direction in academic research more broadly nonetheless remains that of continued acceleration towards 'best evidence'. 7 The image to which I will return is the now canonical 'evidence hierarchy' -that rhetorical tool introduced to trainee medics and other aspiring evidence-based professionals as a means of ranking the relative authority of various types of research design. It is not my intention to explore further here either the claims or the critiques of evidence based research.
Rather, in the argument that is presented in this paper, I start from a position of suggesting simply that the rhetoric of the evidence hierarchy has today become sometimes problematically powerful, and that with such power comes dangers to alternative modes of inquiry (and indeed spheres of human life) that fall short of 'best evidence' as defined by more mainstream and normalised evidence bases.
To come to the substantive core of this discussion then, in this paper I explore the provocative term 'magic' as a tool for capturing the rich and wonder-ful experiences of illness and recovery that escape elucidations of the world as recorded by 'best evidence' (including but not limited to the unusual world-building of psychotic and delusional experiences and the kind of magic that happens in properly therapeutic encounters). To speak of magic in a discussion of the evidence base is clearly to challenge ordinary codes of knowing that support 'best evidence'. Like its literary ally magical realism, magic for me then is a disruptive tool, drawing to our attention to the politics of knowledge that unfurl between that which can be considered admissible evidence and that which is mere fantasy. Yet to talk of magic is also an aesthetic or textual gesture (a matter of talking and writing) -seeking to redress and reinvigorate what has been identified by myself and others as a narrative thinness in academic style that has become anaesthetised by the impassive language of the scientific report, far beyond the confines of the randomised controlled trial. 8 In appropriating here the language not just of magic but magical realism, I seek to focus the position of this article into a 4 direct and explicit exchange with the competing and more dominant realism of the mainstream 'evidence base'.
Magic is best demonstrated empirically and as such I illustrate this paper with various kinds of evidence from my own research in the field of mental health rehabilitation and psychiatric survivorship (2007-2013). 9 It is my contention that magic is everywhere, but many of the stories I have selected here are from those in my research considered 'hardest to help': those with very longstanding histories of mental ill health, complex diagnoses, long-term disengagement from the labour market, concurrent problems with drug or alcohol misuse, contact with the criminal justice systemor simple inability to gain relief or cure from more mainstream psychiatric interventions. This forms part of the argument: that for people who appear most challenging to mainstream service-providers or policies, recovery might be particularly dependent on the right kind of magical touch.
Discovering Magic
How does an academic geographer enculturated in the social science traditions become interested in 'magic'? I approach this question with a reflection upon my own journey as an ethnographer and magically oriented geographer, based upon ethnographic and narrative research projects to include doctoral and postdoctoral work, spanning (at the time of writing) an eight year period.
To tell a story then: for me, magic arrived on around and about the twenty-second month of my doctoral fieldwork, on a rainy afternoon in the final weeks before Christmas, at the therapeutic work programme I have called elsewhere the Plumtree Centre. 10 Formally, the project was a qualitative study of the links between work, employment and mental (ill) health, comprising ethnographic and interview-based fieldwork at a range of therapeutic workshops and employment rehabilitation projects in the North East of England. At the time of commencing, this was a field consumed with the question of how best to get recipients of long-term sickness benefits back into the paid labour market. In any standard review of the evidence, the large scale quantitative study or systematic review of employment outcomes would form the archetypal research type. 11 As my own work progressed however, I became less interested in overarching trends in back to work journeys (the stuff of the conventional evidence base) and instead in the incredible and indeed awe-inspiring differences between individual experience -and in the variously strange, courageous, funny, upsetting Laws, J. (forthcoming) Magic at the Margins, cultural geographies, DOI: 10.1177/1474474016647367 5 and inexplicable encounters that constituted so much of what I saw happening at the Centre and yet which were almost completely absent from more systematic and policy-facing research accounts.
We might say that these are the types of revelation that are experienced by every ethnographer. However, on that December day, watching as the work team became briefly diverted from their workshop activities to witness the season's first meagre snowflakes and someone saying something about there being 'some kind of magic' at Plumtree today (referring both to snowflakes and the whole way we'd all pulled together all afternoon), these ideas began crystilising as fast as the 'the rhetoric of suffering has little meaning'. 22 Encouraged by this flurry of turns towards the more-than-rational and more-than-empirical then, in my new role as a magically-oriented researcher I positioned myself as a collector of stories 6 about that which seemed otherwise 'beyond' or 'in excess of' 23 the regular empirical research report.
The resulting research portfolio might to an extent be understood as a catalogue of everyday magic -of mystery illnesses and magical cures, of magical therapeutic happenings, and sometimes of the complex and problematic magic of despair and madness.
And so the people I introduce in my research -again, many of whom themselves articulated their stories through some reference to magic or enchantment -include the new mother who falls into a fairy-tale sleep for exactly two years (a real life sleeping beauty, or so her husband says) 24 or the respondent who, on the brink of suicide in the wake of an abusive marriage, finds herself in a halted train carriage in the midst of a power-cut when she discovers 'as if by magic', left behind in the seat beside her, a self-help book about surviving abuse in which pencilled into the inside cover is written her maiden name and furthermore a folded bookmark of a newspaper cutting which advertises an affordable housing scheme for people who are 'just starting out alone', where she will eventually end up living. 25 But also in the catalogue are the people who live with the dark and difficult magical burdens that unusual psychological experiences can bring. 26 I will talk later of David, a former employee of a local public transport provider, who must 'check' (tap lightly with his knuckles) the walls and floors of his surroundings at intervals directed by invisible voices in order to secure the timely running of the North East bus network and prevent the apocalypse; or Deborah, who (as she puts it) is 'entirely normal' apart from her fear of particular shades of green 27 , and who thus lives almost entirely indoors in a green-free safe-house. An interesting facet of becoming a magicallyorientated geographer is that the further I became interested in these kinds of story, the more I found them coming to me -both in the figurative sense of the imaginative impetus to recognise such moments within any particular research encounter, and also in a literal way -the research participant, for example, who would phone me up and say, 'I have a friend here and I think you would be interested in her story'. I refer us again to the quotation from the writer and dramatist Eden Phillpotts with which I open this paper: 'The universe is full of magical things, patiently waiting for our wits to grow sharper'. 
Finding magic in the evidence
Traditional approaches in psychiatric research have tended to downplay the contents of delusions to focus instead on the social and clinical consequences of living with psychosis. But what of the many ways in which the imaginary world of fighter planes and secret missions invades the very real spaces of the material world and secret missions transgress the binary between fantasy and the real?
If magic evades a positive description (in that, as a collection of occurrences beyond the conventional evidence base, a concept which is defined primarily through that-which-it-is-not), in each of the above examples, I try instead to capture just one aspect of this thing I call magic. And so, as candidates of magic we include: that moment of therapeutic awakening that emerges so surprisingly after years of therapeutic failure 29 to a later strand of my research, which this time included conducting paired interviews with mental health service-users who had taken part in previous research projects and the researchers who had interviewed them, about the experience of telling and hearing mental health stories in academic contexts. 30 Echoing Sara Mackian's comments about the strains of researching unconventionally evidenced phenomena 31 , what emerged in these discussions was how many of the marginal experiences I have here called magic were at each stage of the research process removed, adjusted or politely forgotten in the final research outputs. As Mackian reports of her own research into spiritual encounters 32 , the routes for such 'silencing' (or at the very least, omission) of magic from the evidence base were various -because such experiences weren't disclosed by the participant to the researcher in the first place or else weren't recognised as the sort of thing that constituted 'proper' data, or quite often, because they were expressed but were later dismissed (and again, for all kinds of reasondisbelief or lack of understanding about what the respondent had reported; concern about how a research piece containing such stories might be received; the lack of a common language to speak about magical occurrences; or simply the lack of space to tell stories in academic reports). It is interesting to note that such censorship emerged from respondents as well as researchers in these encounters (i.e., this is not a straightforward tale of the researcher-researched power inequality). To return to the woman from my own research with the book on the broken-down train, the interview ended: 'I feel a bit weird saying all this in front of the tape recorder … it doesn't feel very scientific somehow'. 33 While magic might not always 'feel' the stuff of a scientific research encounter however, it is important to stress simultaneously that to believe in the everyday enchantments of the people I discuss in my research requires no formal departure from the metaphysics and epistemological commitments of the regular evidence base, but rather only its rhetoric. To summarise the arguments I make about everyday magic and its relation to 'best evidence' then: (1) magic, as here phrased, is an ordinary part of the human world, particularly where concerning matters of breakdown and recovery (the ontological argument); (2) the evidence base, as it currently stands, is impoverished by the lack of a full appreciation of magic (the epistemological argument); (3) it follows that social inquiry should expect to encounter magic and should design itself where possible to see magic and the prosaic together (the methodological argument).
A magical realist perspective
For some readers no doubt, magic will remain an indulgent candidate for inclusion in a social science Like many of the narratives in my own research, magical realism similarly attunes us to the complex and problematic relations between personal distress and a wider politics of anxiety. In Kafka's Metamorphosis, Gregor Samsor wakes one rainy morning to find he has been 'transformed in his bed into a horrible vermin' 41 , apparently a result of his long working hours as a travelling salesman.
Similarly, in Gogol's The Nose 42 , the reader follows the story of Major Kovalev, whose nose falls off his face and runs away to lead a life without him -an experience which appears to be the result of the myriad frustrations of Russian bureaucracy. Many of the vignettes I include in my own evidence base reveal something of the tensions between the individualised narratives of 'illness' and broader socio-cultural-political distress (consider the case of Pete (p. CROSSREF), for instance, whose story seems as explicable through the combined lenses of labour market restructuring and retrenchments of the welfare state as it does from some clinical class of depression). Yet -breaking away from less fantastical literary traditions -the literal transfigurations that encumber the characters of Kafka or Gogol above also provide ways of talking about the intensity and vitalism with which individuals come to carry the tensions of an economic system in mind and body: consider Sally (another participant in my research), who has been working double shifts at a 24 hour supermarket, and who has become increasingly convinced that her body is part of the till, and that her hands transferring money from customer to cash draw are just part of the machinery (in fact, appropriately for a machine, she has actually lost feeling in both arms: indeed it was this symptom rather than feelings of mental ill-health that encouraged her to consult her doctor).
Beyond the critique of individualist accounts of mental distress, magical realist stories also offer prototypes for moving beyond the biases of institutional power that can reside 'between the lines' of traditional mental health research writing. The second strength I find in magical realism then is a mode of talking about intense or unusual emotional experiences without automatic deferral to the institutionalised authorities of psychology or medicine. The characters of magical realist texts are in various combinations suffering or disabled, or apparently 'mad' or haunted -however, and in a way that cannot be said for many literary forms dealing more explicitly with distress and unhappiness, in shying away from the expressly psychological, magical realism simultaneously remains assuredly non-reductive (by which I mean neither medicalised nor psychologised). In contrast to the literary genres from which the medical and social sciences have traditionally sought insight -patient testimonies and biographies (Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Sylvia Plath), for example -magical realism speaks little of the emotional experience of sickness and recovery and less still of the world of therapists, doctors and treatments. In The Nose, Kovalev finds the disappearance of his extremity a matter for the police rather than the physician and Gogol provides little information as to how Kovalev might feel about such inconvenience; in Metamorphosis, Gregor's family sends the doctor away when they realise what misfortune has befallen him. I reiterate here that this is a de-centred rather than a re-centred mode of approaching power and knowledge -and so it is not that medicine or the psychological are demonised in magical realism, but rather that they are simply not indispensable. Such achievement will be instructive to the kind of approach that critical approaches to researching mental distress find necessary too -that is, neither to take for granted any inherent authority of the psychological or medical professions, yet also to avoid some of the more dogmatic and universalistic objections of reactive anti-psychiatry either.
Third and more importantly in my defence for a magical realist geography is the impressive and compassionate approach to conceptualising difference that I find in magical realist literary genres 43 , a feature we will find particularly instructive with regard to the requirements in mental health geographies and indeed geographical inquiry more broadly both to consider the radical differentiation of individual narratives and to speak collectively (socially and politically) about the conditions of distress. In terms of the 'evidence base', this is significant: in any endeavour which seeks to represent the experiences and views of those who have felt first-hand the effects of mental illness lies a question of who can speak for whom -especially in a group which demonstrates already such 'wonderful' differences' 44 . More prosaically however, regardless of our analytic or methodological preferences, the unescapable demands of writing -the tasks of synthesising an argument or empirical data (from [On hearing about the arrival of the angel], the most unfortunate invalids on earth came in search of health: a poor woman who since childhood had been counting her heartbeats and had run out of numbers; a Portuguese man who couldn't sleep because the noise of the stars disturbed him; a sleepwalker who got up at night to undo the things he had done while awake; and many others with less serious ailments. 45 In this list of unfortunates, we are told much about the nature of unhappiness: that the concerns of these individuals are to be taken seriously; that there are many others like them. Furthermore, in this extract, a wonderful sense of collective individualism is seen which I think epitomises magical realism.
Despite the woeful atomism of their individual complaints, the invalids move both as a discrete subsection of society and as inhabitants of a common, shared world (the story opens with the assertion that 'the world had been sad since Tuesday'). Illness is never reduced to the Other since death and madness are in Pelayo and Elisenda's house from the start -the narrator tells us in the introduction to the story that the eponymous angel had been visiting to collect their child (although after the accident, the child is miraculously cured). And yet suffering is never reduced to the collective, either: these individuals -trapped as they are in the unique responsibilities of their magical illnesses -must be treated with the particularity that their concerns demand. The list -which is Márquez' literary device -is thus another trope of magical realism which I find helpful, instructing the reader to see how condensing a number of individuals into a class or kind is both a necessary and a problematic strategy. 46 Yet the final, and most important, argument upon which I shall focus the remainder of this article concerns the realism of magical realism itself, although in conclusion I will take this argument through realism to pragmatism, which will be the final resting point of my case for magic. For many commentators, the most distinctive feature of magical realism is its ontological intervention: unsurprisingly, the introduction of magic to everyday settings and the refusal to allow a hierarchical approach to reality in which magic is subordinate to more ordinary metaphysical happenings.
Certainly, this 'ontological flattening' 47 is one strength of the genre and part of its helpfulness to our discussion: if magical realism simultaneously says, 'everything is as real as everything else' and 'we cannot be sure what is real and so we shall treat all things equally' then this offers a respectful and inclusive attitude towards the minority experiences and magical happenings that are often excluded from traditional evidence bases (a strategy which might already be apparent in responding to the magical stories in my own research). 48 In displaying what is metaphysically bizarre or unreal in textually realistic lights, magical realism as such opens a new 'mythical and magical perspective on reality' 49 -often with the effect of revealing to the reader what is strange and incongruous about the status quo of the regular world. Beyond this, the alternative world evoked in magical realism and the non-stratified ontologies that produce it are themselves subversive-disrupting the hegemony of modernist literature in which the magical and mysterious are marginalised in relation to rational logocentric narrative modalities 50 -and, for the case I seek to make here, blowing apart a stratified theory of knowledge and method, in which 'hierarchies of evidence' will be natural effects.
However, despite this talk of ontological assertion (of realistic narration, of magic-as-real), what impresses me more about magical realist literary forms and their potential for a magically informed social science is their simultaneous and paradoxical withdrawal from or agnosticism towards (lack of interest in, even) questions of ontology -for at the same time it is true that very rarely is ontology deeply questioned either by the characters themselves in magical realist stories or by their authors. In A Very Old Man, it is thus indicative that Pelayo and Elisenda are at first a little afraid of the angel who appears in their courtyard, but 'very soon overcome their surprise' 51 and 'in the end find him familiar' 52 , in the same way that the villagers in Márquez's story are able to respond to the unusual impairments of the travellers who come to visit the angel with non-judgemental and unfussing practicality. In magical realist fiction, this ontological reticence of characters and their authors provides an essential means for 'the story to progress', for people to get on with doing what they need, for a brief escape from the relentless obligation to explain, interpret and justify the things that one feels or experiences (a curse inflicted upon the mentally ill). It is thus this highly practical, pragmatic, quality of a withdrawal from questions of ontology that I suggest has potential in matters of severe and enduring mental distress, not just in the scholarly pursuit of building evidence bases, but in the on-the-ground matters of caring and responding too. 53 Having started out by working in philosophically realist dimensions it is finally then with a pragmatic position that I finalise the case for magical realism in social science's treatments of mental distress. It is my opinion that social research and scholarly writing about mental distress have for too long concentrated on questions of ontology and causation (i.e. the status of unhappiness as an illness and its possible causes), i.e. what we can now see as the fussy process of establishing what is real.
Both academic psychiatry and its critics fall into this trap in their keenness to persuade us either of the biogenetic bases of mental ill health or to disabuse us of such beliefs (we are left with the memory that mental illness may or may not be a myth, 54 but with less certainty about what this means for us).
Freud too, in his almost exclusive interest in the psycho-origins of distress, seems guilty of not matching his commitment to establishing causation with care for whether such insight will be helpful to his patients. In contemporary and dominant forms of social science research (the focus of this paper), the heavy emphasis on 'best evidence' might similarly be seen to overtake other valuable ways of thinking about and responding to people in distress and sickness -when research (like mine) can sit only on the bottom rung of those policy-facing evidence hierarchies -and when interventions like the Plumtree Centre struggle to justify their continued existence without being able to demonstrate that they are evidence-based. 55 Perhaps then a magical pragmatist approach offers one way of moving beyond this interpretive and evidence-fixated struggle. Magic happens and transforms people's lives. Thankfully, we may feel, the current world has a little less of the transcendental magic seen in magical realismyet interruptions from a magical world shape people's lives alongside and along with the forces more ordinarily considered by social science research.
I return to the man I call David, the ex-bus driver who compulsively checks the walls and furniture around him at fixed times during the day. While we might spend much time thinking of reasons for David's compulsive tapping behaviours, if we are going to keep up with David or help him integrate in a mainstream 'non-tapping' world, we (as researchers, policy-makers, mental health professionals, friends) must accept that David does tap walls and must cease being alarmed by every instance of tapping and checking that David displays. Similarly, we might think of Deborah, the participant on the back-to-work project, whose phobia of the colour green has kept her captive in her home for the last several years. If we were working with Deborah we might do well to remember that green is an historically unlucky colour 56 ('And with a green and yellow melancholy, she sat like patience on a monument, smiling at grief', Twelfth Night, II, ii) -her 'madness' here is not unintelligible. Likewise, we might be particularly sensitive to Deborah's strict Catholic upbringing in a rural community, where the condemnation of lay superstitions as 'deviances of religion' was equalled by the incessant superstitions of the Catechism. Yet interpretation does little to capture the phenomenological greenness of green 57 or the particular powers which prevent Deborah from trespassing onto green vocabularies (Wednesday is a difficult day because Wednesday is unlucky in its own right [Wednesday's child is full of woe] but also because Wednesday is recycling day and thus the day that the green bins come out). Whatever are the reasons for Deborah's unusual disposition, for now, if we want to help Deborah find a work placement, we must simply accept that green is off limits (a particular component of the geography of Deborah's home town then will mean anything involving the Newcastle light railway Green Line) and to do so without fuss or condescension. We might feel that in the longer term it would be preferable to encourage Deborah and David beyond these magical worlds and the entrapment they bring, but in the meantime, we are going to have to work with and not against such magic.
Pragmatism may seem a strange stopping place for a paper which has drawn heavily on magical realism -especially where we see pragmatism as only an instrumentalist theory of knowledge into which magic doesn't fit easily -and especially where we see realism and pragmatism as irrevocably separated poles of philosophy. 58 Yet, in the analysis I have offered above -that the innovation in magical realism is less its experimental engagement with ontology than its circumnavigation of or withdrawal from ontological angst -it appears that pragmatism, especially of the 'neo' kind which has been associated most closely with Richard Rorty, is highly commensurate with the remarks I am making. To turn to Rorty directly:
[Pragmatism] says that truth is not the sort of thing one should expect to have a philosophically interesting theory about. For pragmatists, 'truth' is just the name of a property which all true statements share. It is what is common to 'Bacon did not write Shakespeare,' 'E equals mc 2 ,' 'Love is better than hate'. They doubt this for the same reason they doubt there is much to be said about the common feature shared by such morally praiseworthy actions as Susan leaving her husband, America joining the war against the Nazis, Socrates not escaping from jail, Roger picking up litter from the trail, and the suicide of the Jews at Masada. [...] When they suggest that we do not ask questions about the nature of Truth and Goodness, they do not invoke a theory about the nature of reality or knowledge or man which says that 'there is no such thing' as Truth and Goodness. Nor do they have a 'relativistic' or 'subjectivist' theory of Truth or Goodness. They would simply like to change the subject. 59 As Rorty has it then, matters of truth, as of ethics, are less something that correspond in any representational sense to reality than simply ways of thinking that allow one to move or to act in particular ways that make sense at that time. In this way, pragmatism attempts exactly that which magical realism does-to do away with a stratified theory of knowledge in which particular kinds of truth or evidence are valued higher than others: the pyramids of evidence in which only the tightest clinical trials make top ranks or the traditional division between scientific and magical or sane and mad affairs that organise ordinary discourse. It is this way in which Rorty sees pragmatism as overcoming traditional means of dividing the 'assemblage of true statements' 60 To mirror my tripartite formulation earlier in this paper, advocating a pragmatic base from which to develop a magically-informed social science then is a way of (1) rejecting hierarchical theories of truth which limit the kinds of knowledge that are admissible as social science evidence, in order (2) to conceptualise the maximum number of dimensions of mental distress and recovery, so that (3) we can act in the world in a way which is meaningful to each of these contexts in equal regard.
Like most journeys into unfamiliar or magical territories, exploring magical realist (and magical pragmatist) textual forms is not without its dangers. Echoing concerns within literary critique of the genre's postcolonial credentials, 61 associating the experiences of madness and unhappiness with the magic of magical realism risks a romanticism or exoticism of mental difference that is counter to its desired subversive politics. 62 More prosaically, contrary to the greater thrust of the 'emotional turn' in geography, the prevailing character of magical realist fictional writing is itself distinctly unaffective -giving little space to the feel or texture of suffering or depression (or indeed any other element of internal sensation or experience, including that of wonder or enchantment itself). 63 I have argued that the strength of this stylistic form, which I have attempted to emulate here in the matterof-fact narration of my own empirical casework, is to offer more pragmatic and non-judgemental ways of presenting mad experiences than those told through exclusively psycho(patho)logical
perspectives. Yet it is apparent that this strategy cannot be sufficient alone. Simultaneously, we must also find space for forms of magical writing -like Smith et al's descriptions of the magical distortions of phobias, perhaps -that explore distress and madness in ways that reveal too their phenomenological and affective depth and complexity.
Suggesting a way to learn from magical realism -or indeed magical pragmatism -then is not to offer some new competing method for the analysis of magical realist or other magical narratives, nor to deny value in approaches to academic research in geography and beyond whose interests are to consider the reality-status of events and phenomena (for to suggest this would be to replicate the very kind of epistemological violence that has concerned me in the 'best evidence' agenda). Rather, it is just -as Rorty has it -to 'change the conversation', to move on from the question, to 'work around'.
A manifesto in the making
Having suggested some ways in which the literary genre of magical realism might begin to offer some ways of incorporating the experiences I have called 'magic' into more mainstream evidence bases, it is my intention to end this paper with some thoughts of how this might play out in practice -for instance at the level of developing mental health policy or strategic direction in geographical research and beyond. The following is a prototype for academics, policy-makers, and organisations working with people in mental distress (although naturally such prototype would require development differently for each of these audiences). I have presented this as a manifesto as a reference both to ideologies of academic research which imagine speaking back to policy as the only way of 'mattering' in the academy; also as an allusion to that other older action philosophy that had magical ideas about how to change the world. 64 Admittedly, the manifesto is scant on detail in places (a common failing of manifestos...). Yet perhaps any move towards a more magical geography, like Merrifield's cautious rendition of Macondo, will have to be one that allows space for both imagination and pragmatics to unfurl at the level of the local and particular.
A manifesto for a magically informed method in distress and madness i.
Believe in magic and its possibilities, both positive and negative.
ii. Take magical experiences seriously, be these magical moments of recovery or the (dark?) magic of madness and distress. Develop cultures of research and professional practice in which magical happenings are legitimate topics of conversation.
iii. Challenge forms of governing professional practice and service delivery that prevent or prohibit magic. Examples include hyper-bureaucracy and micro-management that will discourage the kind of spontaneous therapeutic happenings described in this paper, or highly performative cultures in which formal measurements of outputs ignore and override magic when it arises (stopping to watch the snowflakes, no less). The magical manifesto and notes from the field with which I conclude this paper are consciously playful. However, if 'playing' with the ways in which we imagine the world and think and learn in the academy has long been the imagined purpose of cultural geography, then it must be seen that like the excursions into magic undertaken by others alongside me 66 , that this is also a critical effort -in the case of my everyday catalogues of magic, reinvigorating and re-politicising the border between what we consider known and unknowable (and on whose authority we draw the boundaries) and gently moving away from that idea that magic only matters in a land far, far away. 'The universe is full of magical things, patiently waiting for our wits to grow sharper'.
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